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THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
KANT’S RELIGION: “PURE COGNITION OF”
OR “BELIEF IN” GOD1
Pamela Sue Anderson

In my response-paper, I dispute the claim of Firestone and Jacobs that “Kant’s
turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition via pure cognition
is perhaps the most important new element of his philosophy of religion” (In
Defense of Kant’s Religion, 233). In particular, I reject the role given—in the
latter—to “pure cognition.” Instead I propose a Kantian variation on cognition which remains consistent with Kant’s moral postulate for the existence
of God. I urge that we treat this postulate as regulative. So, in place of pure
cognition, “belief in” God grounds our hope for perfect goodness.

A Challenge to IDKR and A Defense of Kant
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR) is a great source for—amongst other
things—engaging a range of critical, contemporary readings of Kant’s
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Criticisms of Kant’s Religion
are brought together in a polemical and provocative manner which readily
enhanced the “Authors meet Critics” session of the 2009 Society for Christian Philosophy; this included an early version of my response as a friendly
Critic. In the present version of that response, I focus more squarely on
the critical significance given to “pure cognition” and related uses of
“cognized” and “cognizing” in IDKR. My question is, would Kant agree
with the fundamental and specific role that Firestone and Jacobs give to
pure cognition?
At one point Firestone and Jacobs explain that “cognition” as the English translation of the German Erkenntnis means “to come to know” or
“to know” (IDKR, 109). They add that when Erkenntnis is translated into
This paper is a reworking of the response which I gave to the Society of Christian
Philosophers of Religion in the “Authors Meet Critics” session on Chris L. Firestone and
Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2008) at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, in Montreal. I
would like to thank both the Society and the authors, Firestone and Jacobs, for re-igniting
the interest of contemporary philosophers of religion in Immanuel Kant, Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason (trans. George di Giovanni in Religion and Rational Theology, ed.
George di Giovanni and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997],
39–216). This means not only rekindling my own interest, but that of philosophers of religion, theologians and other contemporary philosophers who work on Kant.
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English as “cognition” in Kant’s texts, it is commonly read as a synonym
for knowledge; this is the case even when “knowledge” is the English
translation of Wissen, not Erkenntnis. They also point out that in 1933
Norman Kemp Smith translated both Erkenntnis and Wissen “knowledge”
in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (IDKR, 109–110 and 249 n18). But, instead
of following Kemp Smith’s translation of Erkenntnis as knowledge for both
empirical and pure knowledge, Firestone and Jacobs prefer empirical and
pure cognition; their use of cognition is meant to stress the process of
coming to know. They distinguish the cognitive process from the product of cognition; and the product is Wissen, i.e., knowledge. In fact, their
point about translation is not new. Already in 1997 Paul Guyer and Allen
Wood published the most recent translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in which Erkenntnis is generally cognition and Wissen is knowledge.
Instead, the question is whether Firestone and Jacobs contribute anything
new concerning cognition to philosophical debates about Kant’s Religion.
Or, are they simply mistaken about pure cognition as a highly distinctive process of coming to know in Religion? If a mistake, then we must
further question Firestone and Jacobs’s assumption that pure cognition is
different from the process of empirical cognition and from the product,
whether empirical knowledge or practical knowledge. As I will show, neither of the latter in Kant can be “pure” in the sense of without the a priori
forms of sensibility.
I have chosen to assess critically the comments of Firestone and Jacobs
themselves concerning pure cognition in IDKR (105–115) precisely because this conception appears fundamental and original to Firestone and
Jacobs’s own reading of Kant’s Religion. It is pure cognition which they
take to form a link between the Religion and the Critique of Pure Reason
(IDKR 109–119).
So, my main focus is what seems original in Firestone and Jacobs’s
reading of Kant, and not so much their defense of Kant’s Religion against
criticisms. I have chosen to engage Firestone and Jacobs themselves rather
than their “prosecutors,” and so not to engage directly their selection of
Kant critics in contemporary philosophy of religion. My focus on the possibility of Firestone and Jacobs’s achieving something original enables
a critical discussion of the fundamental significance of pure cognition
to their overall defense of Kant’s Religion (see especially IDKR 6, 41, 63,
105–119, 125, 155, 168–170, 233–234, and 254 n41). There is not space here
to elaborate the fundamental significance of pure cognition each time it
appears in IDKR. Yet in what I discuss, I would like to remain a friendly
critic of Firestone and Jacobs’s interpretation of Kant, especially of the
cognition which they identify as pure.
Pure cognition as used by Firestone and Jacobs could be a catch-all
label. It seems to take on a significant role in relation to Kant’s other
conceptions in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.
For example, Firestone and Jacobs give pure cognition the role of coming to know Kant’s transcendental ideas, regulative principles, pure a
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priori postulates, rational faith and moral religion (IDKR 105–124; cf. Kant
1997, A642–649/B670–677 and A822–829/B851–857). This role is not wholly
misplaced. In fact, their conception could have the originality of a new
“Kantian” (rather than Kant’s own) conception of a process for achieving
(practically) what is otherwise inexplicable. Nevertheless, if this is the
goal, it would help readers to know that Firestone and Jacobs’s conception of pure cognition is a “variation” (or, something similar) on Kant’s
own philosophy.1 Admittedly, Firestone and Jacobs find the distinction
between pure cognition and empirical cognition in one of his Lectures on
Metaphysics (cf. IDKR, 112–113).2 Even so, a more substantial defense of
the necessary conditions for this distinction between an empirical and a
pure process of coming to know in Kant’s Religion would need to be given,
while remaining consistent with the conception of cognition in Kant’s
first and second Critiques.
My challenge is to provoke further discussion of the large questions
raised by the pivotal role given to pure cognition in IDKR. Is this role
compatible with Kant’s architectonic of pure reason? Is it compatible with
the relation of his empirical realism to transcendental idealism? And is it
compatible with his moral and critical philosophy?
These large questions are impossible to answer adequately in a short
paper. Nevertheless, my questions about Firestone and Jacobs’s “Kantian”
conception raise at least a serious, general objection; that is, the Kant of
the three Critiques would be unequivocal in rejecting any suggestion that
pure cognition of “the idea” of God could serve as a rational justification
for knowledge of God’s existence or for knowledge of “the highest good in
the world.”3 As Kant’s Religion makes clear: “‘There is a God, hence there
is a highest good in the world,’ . . . is a synthetic a priori proposition.”4
When it comes to cognition as a process and knowledge as the product,
Firestone and Jacobs fail to distinguish what Kant says at points as part
of his explanation of the pure nature of cognition and his own overall arguments in the first two Critiques and the Religion about “the unmoveable
boundaries” (unveraendliche Grenzen) of human sensibility.5 To demonstrate
this, I will offer salient quotations from Kant’s own texts which go counter
to Firestone and Jacobs’s conception. The perplexing question for my reading is how Firestone and Jacobs can be so definite that pure cognition of “the
1
In describing their Kantian conception as a “variation” on Kant’s own philosophy, I
take a term from A. W. Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in
Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2003).
2
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, ed. and trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29: 945.
3
Kant, Religion, 6:6*.
4
Ibid.
5
For further discussion of Kant’s use of “boundaries” (Grenzen) and “limits” (Schranken)
in the Critique of Pure Reason, see Pamela Sue Anderson, “Metaphors of Spatial Location:
Understanding Post-Kantian Space,” in Kantian Metaphysics Today: New Essays on Time and
Space, ed. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012), 167–182.
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prototype of the pure moral disposition”6 is possible for Kant, despite the
boundaries of sensibility Kant himself fixed for human cognition. Without
hesitation, Firestone and Jacobs boldly conclude that “Kant’s turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition via pure cognition is perhaps
the most important new element of his philosophy of religion” (IDKR, 233).
At times, I think that Firestone and Jacobs have simply misunderstood
Kant’s own references to (pure) cognition, as if “transcendental analyses”
could explain the purity of the two activities of (i) coming to know and (ii)
unpicking the non-empirical; that is, “the human mind [is able] to grasp
the prototype’s moral perfection” (IDKR, 168). This grasp of the mind
sounds like what Kant himself would call “intellectual intuition.”7 I will
contend that, on the one hand, no object of human knowledge can ever
be perfect, non-spatial and eternal. For human beings, “pure cognition”
is not possible, but synthetic a priori cognition is.8 The object of human
cognition requires both the a priori forms of intuition and the pure a priori
concepts of understanding; transcendental analysis cannot generate human knowledge. I cannot grasp perfection; the latter would require both
the sensible forms of intuition and the a priori concepts of understanding,
plus the power of synthesis. Kant’s critiques of pure and practical reason
aim precisely to set boundaries to both empirical and pure cognitions for
human subjects. At most, we human subjects can postulate the existence
of a divine being who would be unconstrained by the boundaries of sensibility; but to be consistent with Kant’s writings, we cannot, in Firestone
and Jacobs’s terms, “cognize” this being or its divine (pure) moral disposition as pure theoretical or pure practical knowledge (here I assume that
“cognize” is not a synonym for “think,” which has a technically different
role in Kant). At most we give a regulative role to a transcendental idea
and, ultimately, to the pure practical ideal of moral perfection.
On the other hand, I would also remind readers that time and space as
synthetic a priori forms of intuition for Kant constitute the unmoveable and
un-traversable boundaries for human cognition. Within these fixed boundaries of space and time, intellectual intuition is impossible. Yet, by analogy,
human reason can think that a non-spatial and a non-temporal being, i.e., a
divine, eternal being, would have intellectual intuition. Kant himself asserts
that “intellectual intuition” belongs solely to “the original being;” yet it can
never pertain to “one that is dependent as regards both its existence and its
intuition (which determines its existence in relation to given objects).”9
At the outset of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stipulates the demanding standard for anything pure. Consider two passages where Kant sets
out these standards:
Kant, Religion, 6:63, 6:66, 6:82–84; cf. IDKR 166–170.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer, ed. with Allen W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), B72.
8
Kant, Religion, 6:6*.
9
Kant, Critique, B72.
6
7
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Among a priori cognitions, however, those are called pure with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition “Every alteration
has its cause” is an a priori proposition, only not pure, since alteration is a
concept that can be drawn only from experience.10
To the critique of pure reason there . . . belongs everything that constitutes
transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic a priori cognition.
. . . [And] although the supreme principles of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy; for, while they do not, to be sure, take the concepts
of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations . . . which are all
empirical in origin, as the ground of their precepts, they still must necessarily include them in the composition of the system of pure morality in the
concept of duty, as the hindrance that must be overcome or the attraction
that ought not to be made into a motive. . . . everything practical, insofar as
it contains incentives, is related to feelings, which belong among empirical
sources of cognition.11

When Kant himself describes either a proposition or the principles of
morality as “pure,” he means that they contain nothing empirical; no empirical intuitions can be contained in a pure proposition. Nevertheless,
as readers of Kant will be aware, synthetic a priori cognition serves Kant
as a necessary condition for cognition of any object which requires both
concepts and intuitions. Even if Firestone and Jacobs stipulate that “pure’
cognition comes via “transcendental analysis” (IDKR, 233) Kant’s “system
of pure morality” has to be conditioned by synthetic a priori cognition.
In Kant’s critical philosophy, the necessary role of the synthesis of
sensible intuitions by pure a priori concepts constitutes a limitation
for human cognition, but no such role and limitation are necessary for
divine cognition. Sensibility sets unalterable boundaries for the very idea
of “pure cognition” (as opposed to transcendental conditions for synthetic
a priori cognition). Precisely because human cognition is limited by space
and time, it always remains unlike pure cognition of an original being;
the latter is by definition non-spatial and non-temporal. A divine being
would simply not conform to, or be restricted by, these necessary, pure
a priori forms of sensible intuitions for human theoretical and practical
knowledge. These can be seen in the fact that the very concept “God” contains no sensible intuitions, i.e., nothing of spatial-temporal experience;
as a result, God’s own intuition would be “intellectual.” In this light, it
remains impossible for us to have either empirical knowledge of a divine
(original) being or synthetic a priori knowledge of God. It is then only on
moral grounds that Kant “postulates” the existence of God (and of the
hoped for immortality). But God as a postulate of pure practical reason
is only “cognize-able” practically in the sense of serving as a regulative
Ibid., B3.
Ibid., A14–15/B28–29.

10
11
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principle of the perfect goodness and the full rationality, which guides
moral action; and Kant is clear in distinguishing between regulative and
constitutive knowledge. Kant’s crucial contention at this stage is the following:
In general, if, instead of [extending to] the constitutive principles of the cognition of supersensible objects into which we cannot in fact have any insight, we restricted our judgment to the regulative principles, which content
themselves with only their practical use, human wisdom would be better
off in a great many respects, and there would be no breeding of would-be
knowledge of something of which we fundamentally know nothing.12

The problem with Firestone and Jacobs’s assuming that practical knowledge is pure cognition is that, to repeat, “everything practical, insofar as it
contains incentives, is related to feelings, which belong among empirical
sources of cognition;”13 and so, practical cognition cannot be strictly pure in
the sense of without any imposition of sensibility. One possible way around
this problem of inconsistency in IDKR would be to treat Firestone and
Jacobs’s pure cognition as a “variation” on Kantian cognition in the first
and second Critiques. However, the problem persists even when Firestone
and Jacobs claim that pure cognition is “in the human mind,” as if human
knowers could have intellectual intuition. This would be impossible, since
“where one conceives of an object that is not only not an object of intuition
for us but cannot even be an object of sensible intuition for itself, one is careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all of its intuition.”14
Kant is clear that we, as humans, have distinctively human “limitations”
(Schranken) and “boundaries” (Grenzen), due to sensibility, but that these
would not restrict “the original being.” In his words,
In natural theology, where one conceives of an object that is not only not an
object of intuition for us but cannot even be an object of sensible intuition
for itself, one is careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all
of its intuition (for all of its cognition must be intuition and not thinking,
which is always proof of limitations). But with what right can one do this, if
one has antecedently made both of these into forms of things in themselves,
and indeed ones that, as a priori conditions of the existence of things, would
remain even if one removed the things themselves?—for as conditions of all
existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence
of God. If one will not make them into objective forms of all things, then
no alternative remains but to make them into subjective forms of our kind
of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is not
original, i.e., one through which the existence of the object of intuition is
itself given (and that, so far as we can have insight, can only pertain to the
original being); rather it is dependent on the existence of the object, thus it
is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that.
Kant, Religion, 6.71.
Kant, Critique, A15/B29.
14
Ibid., B71–72.
12
13
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It is also not necessarily for us to limit the kind of intuition in space
and time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all finite
thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard
(though we cannot decide this), yet even given such universal validity this
kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that
it is derived (intuitius derivatives), not original (intuitius originarius), thus not
intellectual intuition.15

Again Kant is clear; although intellectual intuition is attributable to “the
original” being, it is not attributable to a human being. Moreover, Kant
himself never elevates human knowledge to that of divine knowledge.
Of course, for Kant, humans can “think” more than they can “know.” But
thinking is not cognizing. To claim that either cognition of original being
or knowledge like that of God is a human possession would fly in the face
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant never gives up these fundamental
features of intuition or cognition. We can have no way to justify knowledge independent of our inner and outer sense. Coming at pure cognition
from different directions, we always come back to the same point in Kant:
human knowledge could not be without the a priori forms of sensible intuition. If it existed, intellectual intuition could be the possession only of
a being which is not restricted by space or time.16
The additional argument of Firestone and Jacobs that there is a “cognizing” of, as presented in Kant’s Religion, “the prototype of perfect humanity” (IDKR 168; also see 167–169) equally fails to recognize that a pure moral
disposition for a human subject could not—according to Kant’s principles
in the first Critique and in the Religion—result from pure cognition. Moral
dispositions of human subjects would have to be shaped by duty, hence,
also by both emotions and reasons for action which make human beings
moral and which require empirical sources of knowledge. To recall the
words of the Critique of Pure Reason, no concepts which “contain in themselves anything empirical” are allowed to enter into (pure) transcendental
philosophy; and this means no empirical concepts can be pure.17 Moreover, to repeat, “all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates
to feelings, and these belong to the empirical sources of knowledge.”18
Thus there is no getting around the fact that human experience for Kant
is a product of both concepts and intuitions; and these empirical concepts
and intuitions require the necessary a priori conditions which make this
experience possible. Even our cognition of “the prototype” of perfect humanity would come up against fixed boundaries to what can be known.19
Human cognition in Kant just cannot escape the pure a priori concepts of
understanding and the a priori synthetic forms of sensibility.
Ibid., B72.
Ibid., B72.
17
Ibid., A14/ B28.
18
Ibid., A15/B29.
19
Kant, Religion, 6:61–6:68.
15
16
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In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant remains consistent
in what he says elsewhere about (cognition of) the perfect moral good, or
“the holy one.” In The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that
What is more, we cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to
derive it from examples. Every example of it presented to me must first be
judged by moral principles in order to decide if it is fit to serve as an original example—that is, as a model: it can in no way supply the prime source
for the concept of morality. Even the Holy One of the gospel must first be
compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise him
to be such.20

Similarly, in the Religion, Kant endorses
the thought that [a] divine human being . . . must attune our mind to admiration. . . . Yet he himself could not be presented to us as an example to be
emulated, hence also not as a proof that so pure and exalted a moral goodness
can be practised and attained by us.21

Kant goes on to explain the above in a footnote, demonstrating that the
pure moral disposition could not be the product of a cognitive process, or
of Firestone and Jacobs’s pure cognition:
we always need a certain analogy with natural being in order to make
supersensible characteristics comprehensible to us . . . although through
reason we cannot form any concept of how a self-sufficient being could sacrifice something that belongs to his blessedness, thus robbing himself of a
perfection. We have here (as means of elucidation) a schematism of analogy,
with which we cannot dispense. To transform it, however, into a schematism
of object-determination (as means for expanding our cognition) constitutes
anthropomorphism, and from the moral point of view (in religion) this has
most injurious consequences.22

I take the above passages to mean that Kant’s conception of human cognition is unable to come to know the supersensible; restricted as it is to
sensibility, human cognition can at most rely upon reason to “form a concept” in order to comprehend moral perfection, while not “expanding our
cognition;” the danger of putting the supersensible, or divine, perfection
into human form is illusion (i.e., anthropomorphism).
In light of the above response, I would like to state the heart of my
challenge to Firestone and Jacobs. This challenge has been directed most
squarely to the role which they give to “pure cognition,” in order to solve
conundrums which they find in other readings of Kant’s Religion. Whether
we take pure cognition as a Kantian variation which Firestone and Jacobs
develop from their own reading of his texts or a misunderstanding of
Kant’s own conception of the human process of coming to know, I have
20
The Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. H. J. Paton
(London: Hutchinson, 1951).
21
Kant, Religion, 6:64–6:65.
22
Ibid., 6:65n.
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not found their notion helpful to judge the “coherence” and “lasting significance” of Kant’s Religion. Instead I urge readers to proceed with caution when it comes to their constructive proposal concerning the role of
cognition as the pure process of coming to know. This caution is directed
at Firestone and Jacobs’s “defense” of the following:
Chapter 4 begins this defense by focusing on key resources in the critical philosophy and in Religion itself that are important preliminary considerations for understanding the shape of Religion and its theological talk.
They are Kant’s notions of pure cognition, the two experiments identified in
the Second Preface of Religion, and the moral disposition, which is a concern
throughout the Religion. (IDKR, 6–7; emphasis added)

In particular, Firestone and Jacobs seem to assume that pure cognition
of what is empirically unknowable is rendered possible by Christ as “the
prototype” of the pure moral disposition. According to their “defense” in
IDKR, this pure cognition has to do with what is in the human mind. Yet
Kant himself makes clear, as my selection of quotations have shown, that
human cognition is not divine or pure in the sense of without sensibility. Instead, the Christian narrative about “the descent of the prototype”
can only be thought by human beings in analogical terms. I have tried
to demonstrate with selections from Kant’s texts that anything more is a
decidedly un-Kantian presumption.
At this point in my response, it should be apparent that Firestone and
Jacobs misunderstand Kant when they presume that pure cognition comes
via a “transcendental analysis” (IDKR, 233). Something similar could be
said of their claim about “cognizing the prototype” via a “transcendental
incarnation” (IDKR, 164–165).23 These sorts of “transcendental” claims
seem un-Kantian, in depending on intellectual intuition of a prototype,
i.e., Christ as God and man. Strictly speaking, this would be impossible,
as shown above in Kant’s terms, for human cognition. In following Kant,
pure cognition could not come by way of transcendental analysis of either
God in Christ or perfect moral goodness in human form. Firestone and
Jacobs may believe that when an idea such as the prototype of the pure
moral disposition is held in the human mind, then it can be cognized in
its purity.24 However, their claim to “cognize” the prototype of humanity
in the mind does not sound like Kant, but possibly more like a Platonic or
subjective idealism.
The positive sense of my challenge advocates that we read Kant in his
own philosophical terms as both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. The result would be to confront both the limits and boundaries
23
Note that Jacobs argued earlier that Kant “requires transcendental incarnation commended by practical reason in order for this cognition to have universal validity” (IDKR,
254 n 41); see Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology: Transcendental Incarnation as a Rational Foundation for God-Talk,” in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L.
Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006),
SS 1–2.
24
Firestone and Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 155–180.
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of Kantian cognition as first set out in his Critiques. To these constraints can
be added the productive role of incomprehensibility in Kant’s arguments
in the Religion; incomprehensibility also has a crucial role in Kant’s Groundwork and in the first and second Critiques. Accepting Kantian incomprehensibility would force readers to reconsider, whether being guilty or innocent
of the incoherence found by Firestone and Jacobs in “indicting” Kant, they
have taken into account the necessary role of sensibility in setting limits
and being a boundary itself to human cognition.
My conclusion is that Kant’s Religion cannot be “indicted” for failing to
have, as Firestone and Jacobs suggest, “lasting philosophical significance
to the field of philosophy of religion” and then defended on the grounds
given (IDKR, 6–7). As apparent in this response, I have not been convinced
that IDKR correctly interprets “pure cognition” as Kant’s conception; similarly, neither Kant’s regulative principles nor his practical postulates can
be “cognized” and become “objects of conviction” (although we might have
convictions about God, freedom and immortality, these would just not be
objects). In other words, I do not see how it can be true that “Throughout
the first Critique, Kant’s consistent concern is that we realize that what cannot be known in theory can, in principle, be cognized and become objects
of conviction on other grounds” (IDKR, 112).
Unlike Firestone and Jacobs, my alternative defense of Kant takes
cognition to be technically different from “belief in” God. While human
cognition would remain the preserve of Kant’s rational-sensible knower
and moral-religious agent,25 neither an empirical example of “the Holy
One” or a human example of being “well-pleasing to God” could be objects
of human knowledge. Instead, I suggest that contemporary debates about
Kant in philosophy of religion would be better off if they focused on “belief
in” God, freedom and immortality. The practical postulate of God’s existence (along with the other two postulates) would, then, be treated not as
propositional “beliefs that” (or convictions that) God exists, but as “belief
in” the idea of God which serves a practical purpose. Although we cannot
have any empirical or synthetic a priori knowledge of God, freedom and
immortality, they nonetheless play highly significant regulative, as distinct
from constitutive, roles for human action. Holding regulative principles is
similar to “belief in” God, which serves as a guide for moral action. Admittedly, my use of belief in would be a variation on Kant’s own work.
The crux of my criticism has been that Firestone and Jacobs rely upon
a problematic conception of “pure cognition” which has not been satisfactorily defended, if it can be defended, as Kant’s own conception. Perhaps,
instead it is a variation on Kant’s philosophy. Yet to see the problem with
the role of cognition here, let us consider the postulate of immortality.
Is this “cognized”? No, it is not cognized in the sense of constitutive
knowledge. Instead a different variation could be compatible with Kant’s
25
Pamela Sue Anderson and Jordan Bell, Kant and Theology (New York and London: Continuum, 2010).
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transcendental idealism, his empirical realism and his practical philosophy, that is, a variation that treats Kant’s transcendental ideas in terms
of belief in God, freedom and immortality. The latter is not the same as
treating Kant’s transcendental ideas as “objects” of any sort of cognition.
The crucial difference is that Kant’s transcendental philosophy gives the
necessary conditions for cognition, but it cannot “cognize” ideas or “grasp
objects” of human knowledge. Let us take the role Kant gives to the idea
of immortality to illustrate my point.
Kant’s practical vindication of the postulate of immortality is not intended to establish its truth; it is cognition of empirical objects (only)
which grounds truth. Instead the practical vindication of the idea of immortality starts from our moral experience and specifically our awareness
of not being fully rational; we are aware of both our imperfections and
our irrationality. If we are to be virtuous, it is up to us as rational agents to
act for the sake of duty alone; yet perfect goodness is always unachievable
in this life. The postulate of immortality gives us at most hope for achieving perfect goodness.
We do not always act as we ought to: we never act in a fully rational
and perfectly good way (even if we did, we could not know it). For Kant,
the source of this failure is not an empirical matter. Instead, as he demonstrates in the Religion, human irrationality—as evil—is radical and inscrutable; that is, it is beyond our comprehension and yet it is not superficial
but profound and pervasive. There can be no pure cognition of the origin
of radical evil; and so, it is not clear how Firestone and Jacobs could treat
evil as, in Kantian terms, an object of conviction. Parallel to this is the
problem of treating the prototype of the pure moral disposition as an
object of pure cognition. We cannot cognize a prototype, and so Kant
employs analogical terms to say that the prototype of the pure moral disposition “descends from heaven.” So, neither empirical nor pure cognition
can give us knowledge of this prototype. Although practically the narrative of the prototype can guide human action as portraying a regulative
principle at work, no knowledge can be derived from a human example
of this prototype.
To end this response, allow me to repeat the central claim of Firestone
and Jacobs. I have endeavoured to dispute the last line here:
we have argued that Kant’s Religion is equally amenable, and perhaps more
so, to a holistic and linear interpretation—one where its arguments are understood to build on one another by unpacking underdeveloped concepts
from his critical philosophy in ways that are intricate and insightful, and
in ways that are not only coherent, but also religiously and theologically
affirmative. Kant’s turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition
via pure cognition is perhaps the most important new element of his philosophy of religion. (IDKR, 233)

Rejecting the role given to pure cognition in IDKR, I urge that we remain faithful to Kant’s critical philosophy and treat his three postulates as
the necessary grounds for the possibility of moral experience. We should
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either (1) follow Kant and accept the boundaries and limitations which he
sets for human cognition or (2) propose a Kantian variation on cognition
which takes his moral postulate for the existence of God as regulative.
One variation on core themes in Kant would be to treat the postulate of,
like belief in, God as our hope for perfect goodness, i.e., the highest good.
University of Oxford, U.K.

